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FACTUAL STATEMENT 
The Stansbury Road was constructed in 1949-50 across private property pursuant to 
written easements by two smelting companies for the purpose of mining an oolitic sands deposit 
located about halfway into Section 16 of Township 1 North, Range 6 West (R. 302-303). In 
1954, at the request of one of the parties operating on the Island (other than Ed Cassity or the 
Castagnos),1 Tooele County commenced occasionally grading the Stansbury Road. (R 1140, 
R 1151 at 431-32, 435-36.) That same year, Tooele County designated the road as a class B 
public road. (R. 1140.) The record does not afford any explanation as to why Tooele County 
designated the Stansbury Road to be a class B public road five years before the expiration of the 
ten years required to dedicate a road. Appellants, however, did not learn of this designation until 
1989-1990. (R. 1150 at 316.) 
Pursuant to a written easement, in 1965 U.S. Magnesium, a predecessor in interest to U.S. 
Magnesium Corp ("referred herein together with its predecessor entities as "MagCorp"), 
constructed a road from the MagCorp parcel to the Stansbury Road. (R. 1149 at 150.) Since that 
time, the MagCorp parcel has been posted no trespassing at the point where the Stansbury Road 
enters onto that property. (R. 1149 at 193, 151-52, 112; R. 1151 at404,R 1401.) After crossing 
the MagCorp parcel, the Stansbury Road becomes part of MagCorp's North Dike, which is the 
private property of MagCorp. (R. 1150 at 281.) Once the Stansbury Road enters onto the 
MagCorp property there are no side roads that afford the public access to either the sovereign 
lands located below the meander line of the Great Salt Lake or public lands located above that 
1
 The only other party the record reveals was operating out on the Island at that time were the 
smelting companies that built the road. The reasonable deduction to be drawn from this testimony, 
therefore, is that it was the smelting companies that requested the county to maintain the road. 
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meander line. Consistent therewith, the record does not evidence a single member of the public 
who used the portion of the road across the MagCorp parcel to access either sovereign or public 
lands. In fact, during the trial the State at best only introduced evidence of three public users 
during the entire history of that segment of the Stansbury Road. (R. 1402-05, 1396-1401, 1519-
1525.) Conversely, Appellants introduced overwhelming evidence through both the State's 
witnesses and their own that the vast majority of people using the Stansbury Road stopped and 
turned around when they came into view of the no trespassing sign posted at the en1 ranee to the 
MagCorp parcel. (R. 1149 at 111-121, R. 1151 at 430-31, R 402-05.) 
The Stansbury Road affords access to three Side Roads known as the South Road, the 
Pass Canyon Road and the Cable Gate Road. Although there did not exist any no trespassing 
signs at the entrance to these Side Roads, no trespassing signs existed where the Stansbury Road 
first enters on to private property and at each location where the road left the property of one 
landowner and entered the property of another. (R. 1150 at 293-96, R. 1137, R. 1150.) These no 
trespassing signs were placed to the side of the road facing on-coming. (R. 1150 at 293-96.) 
Dale Castagno testified that the private property on the Island had always been posted. 
(R. 1948.) Likewise, John Bleazard testified that the foregoing signage existed for as long as he 
could remember. (R. 1150 at 295.) 
Throughout the history of the Stansbury Road, the landowners (or their lessees) who used 
the Island as winter range ordered trespassers to leave their private property, including the 
Stansbury Road and Side Roads. Dale Castagno testified that during the 1950s not only did he 
order trespassers to leave but that he also witnessed his father Stanley Castagno and Ed Cassity 
do the same. (R. 1151 at 412, 418, 423-25; R 1939-43.) In these instances, Dale Castagno 
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testified that they would order the trespassers to go to the south end of the Island where public 
lands are located. (Id) Moreover, this practice was not limited to people who were shouting 
guns, although that was the primary reason people trespassed in the winter. (Id: R. 1151 at 
411-12.) 
From 1960-1975, Dale Castagno leased the Castagno parcels to winter livestock. 
(K 1151 at 416.) During that time period, Dale Castagno testified he continued to order 
trespassers to leave and he witnessed Ed Cassity doing the same. (R. 1151 at 416-18, 423-25; 
R, 1945-46.) Two of the State's witnesses, affiant Keith E. Wanlass and Charles Durfee, also 
testified that they witnessed Ed Cassity order people to leave his private property. (R. 1498-
1502; 1272-78; R. 1151 at 449-57.) 
Following Ed Cassity's death in 1977, John Bleazard assumed the responsibility of 
running Six Mile Ranch Company. (R. 1150 at 305.) Between 1977 and 1993, John Bleazard 
testified that he frequently ordered trespassers to leave the private property, including the 
Stansbury Road and Side Roads (R. 1150 at 310-12, 324-25, 371, 384-86.) From 1983-1993, 
Craig Smith, an employee of Six Mile Ranch Company, testified that he did the same. (R. 1151 
at 428-30.) Although John Bleazard testified he did not always order people who were not 
engaged in objectionable conduct to leave, if people were engaging in objectionable conduct 
such as hunting, shooting or otherwise not behaving he would always order them to leave the 
private property by ordering them to go to the south end of Island. John Bleazard testified that in 
the late 1970s and continuing through the 1980s, he often sought the help of law enforcement to 
prevent trespass. (R 1150 at 314-15.) When these efforts proved unsuccessful in 1989-1990, he 
sought help from the Tooele County Commissioners. (R 1150 at 315-316.) It was at this time 
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that he first learned the Stansbury Road had been designated to be a class B public road. (Id) 
Although Appellants disputed that the Stansbury Road was a public road, to avoid the expense of 
unnecessary litigation, at the suggestion of a Tooele County Commissioners, Appellants and 
other landowners sought and eventually succeeded in having the Tooele County Commission 
enact Ordinance 93-9. (R. 1150 at 316-18, R. 1151 at 442.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court was correct in ruling that the Side Roads were not dedicated to the public. 
This judgment is supported by evidence trespassers were routinely ordered to leave those roads 
and adjoining lands, that the lands were posted "no trespassing" and that Appellants sought the 
assistance of law enforcement to prevent trespass. 
Conversely, the trial court erred in concluding that the Stansbury Road was dedicated to 
the public. Not only do the trial court's finding that trespassers were "occasionally" ordered off 
the Stansbury Road and routinely ordered off the lands adjacent thereto compel the conclusion 
the public's use was not continuous, but the fact that landowners knowingly and willingly 
allowed the public to recreate on their private lands evidences the use of the Stansbury Road was 
permissive. In any event, the evidence does not support the trial court's ruling that a public 
dedication occurred across the MagCorp parcel to the meander line of the Great Salt Lake. 
Furthermore, the MagCorp parcel was owned by the State of Utah until 1989 and, therefore, 
could not have been dedicated to the public as a matter of law. 
Finally, the trial court erred in holding Ordinance 93-9 invalid without first ascertaining 
whether the sovereign lands abutted a "public" road. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT THE 
SIDE ROADS HAD NOT BEEN CONTINUOUSLY USED BY THE 
PUBLIC. 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 72-5-104(1) three elements must be proven to establish that a 
road has been dedicated to the public: (1) continuous use; (2) as a public thoroughfare; (3) for a 
period often years. Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d 307, 310 (Utah 1997) (interpreting the 
earlier version of the statute, former Utah Code Ann. §27-12-89 (1963)); AWINC Corp. v. 
Simonsen, 2005 Ut. App. 168, f 11, 112 P.3d 1228. 
Under Utah law, therefore, the public's use of a road must be "continuous." Although the 
use need not be constant or frequent, it must be established that the public "made a continuous 
and uninterrupted use . . . as often as they found it convenient or necessary." Boyer v. Clark, 326 
P.2d 107, 109 (Utah 1958). That is, the "use may be continuous though not constant. .. 
provided it occurred as often as the claimant [the public] had occasion or chose to pass" 
Richards v. Pine Ranch, Inc., 597 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 1977). 
Any action that interrupts the public's use of a road, therefore, will prevent a public 
dedication. For example, in Draper City v. Bernardo, the Utah Supreme Court reversed an order 
granting summary judgment based on the defendants' affidavits stating that they had posted the 
property "no trespassing," sought law enforcement help to prevent trespass and ordered 
numerous trespassers to leave their property. 889 P.2d 1097, 1099-1100 (Utah 1995). In so 
doing, it distinguished that case from its decision in Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 447, 450 (Utah 
1981): 
We distinguish the instant case from Thurman v. Byram, 626 P.2d 
at 450, where we upheld the dedication of a private road to the 
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public under section 27-12-89. In Thurman, the general public had 
never been asked not to use the road, and the county sheriff had not 
been asked to prevent trespassing. Id. at 449. In contrast, there are 
averments in the instant case that trespassers were directed to leave 
and that the county sheriff and the Draper City police were often 
asked to prevent this illegal activity. 
Id. at 1101. See also Heber City v. Simpson, 942 P.2d at 310; Kohler v. Martin, 916 P.2d 910, 
913 (Utah App. 1996); Bertagnole v. Pine Meadow Ranches, 639 P.2d 211 (Utah 1981); and 
Boyer v. Clark, 326 P.2d at 108-09, wherein there was no evidence of anyone having been asked 
to leave the landowner's private property. 
A. The Evidence of Record Supports the Trial Court's Finding That the 
Side Roads Were Not Continuously Used by the Public. 
In this instance, there is evidence that the private property on which the Side Roads are 
located was posted "no trespassing," that from 1949 until 1993 trespassers were routinely 
ordered to leave the private property, including the Stansbury Road and Side Roads, and that as 
trespass problems increased, during the late 1970s and 1980s Appellants' sought the assistance 
of the Tooele County Sheriff to help prevent trespass. 
1- Members of the Public Were Routinely Ordered to Leave the Private 
Property. 
Appellants introduced evidenced that from 1949 until 1993 members of the public were 
routinely ordered to leave their private property along the Stansbury Road. Specifically, for the 
time period from 1949 to 1977, the pertinent evidence of record is as follows:2 
2
 In the Brief of Appellee at p. 4, it asserts that there is no evidence that the landowners prior to 1977 
treated the land adjacent to the Stansbury Road as private property. Given the testimony set forth 
herein it is evident that the State has failed to marshal the evidence and, therefore, its contention that 
the record does not establish any interruption in public use prior to 1977 should be disregarded. 
AWINCCorp. v. Simonsen, 2005 Ut App. 168, f 110, 112P.2d 1228, 1230. 
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Dale Castagno. Dale Castagno testified that between 1950 and 
1955, whenever he or his father observed people trespassing, they 
ordered them to leave by directing them to go all the way off of the 
grazing allotment to the south end of the Island. (R. 1151 at 412, 
418, 423-425; R. 1939-1943.) Likewise, during this same time 
period he testified that he also witnessed Ed Cassity do the same. 
(R. 1151 at 418; R. 1942-43.) 
Further, Dale Castagno testified that from 1960 to 1975 he leased 
the Castagno property as winter range and continued to order 
trespassers to get all the way off the private property by going to 
the south end of the Island. (R. 1151 at 416-18, 423-25; 
R. 1945-46.) During this same time period, he further testified that 
he also observed Ed Cassity do the same. (R. 1151 at 418.) 
John Bleazard. John Bleazard testified that growing up he was 
present when his grandfather (Ed Cassity) ordered trespassers to 
leave the private property and go all the way to the south end of the 
Island where the public lands are located. (R. 1150 at 296-98.) 
Mark Bleazard. Mark Bleazard testified that when he was twelve 
or thirteen years old (1950 or 1951) he witnessed his grandfather 
(Ed Cassity) stop and confront several trespassers by shooting a 
rifle over their heads and then had them get in to the back of his 
pickup so that he could drive them to the south end of the Island 
where he told them not to come back. (R. 1151 at 438-39.) 
Keith "Eddie" Wanlass. In his affidavit Ed Wanlass states, "I have 
been with my grandparents and others several times when he asked 
people with guns to leave their private property as well as leased 
land [public lands] if cattle or horses were out there." (R. 1498-
1502.) 
Charles "Butch" Durfee. In his affidavit Charles Durfee states that 
between 1963 and 1974 he once witnessed Ed Cassity order 
trespassers off his private land. (R. 1272-78.) 
During trial, however, he acknowledged that in fact he was present 
on multiple occasions when he witnessed Ed Cassity kick people 
off his private property, including one memorable incident where 
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he confronted four trespassers who were hunting along the side of 
the Stansbury Road:3 (R. 1151 at 449-51.) 
Likewise, for the time period from 1977 to 1993, there also exists substantial evidence 
that trespassers were ordered to leave the private property. 
John Bleazard. Between 1977 and 1993, John Bleazard testified 
that he repeatedly ordered numerous trespassers to leave the 
private property along the Cable Gate Road, Pass Canyon Road, 
the South Road and the Stansbury Road. (R. 1150 at 310-12, 324-
25, 371, 384-86.) In addition, John Bleazard testified that 
commencing in the last 1970s and continuing through the 1980s, 
he sought the assistance of the Tooele County Sheriffs Office to 
prevent trespass which issued citations for trespassing, including 
people who had vehicles parked along the road. (R. 1150 at 312-
13.) Further, John Bleazard testified that the Sheriffs Department 
provided to him numerous booklets of warning tickets which he 
would fill out and place a copy of on people's vehicles parked 
along the road. (R. 1150 at 314-15.) 
Craig Smith. From 1983 through 1993 Craig Smith testified he 
was an employee of Six Mile Ranch Company and, in connection 
therewith, he ordered people to leave the private property, 
including Cable Gate Road and Pass Canyon Road. (R. 1151 at 
428-30.) 
3
 Mr. Durfee's testimony regarding this incident wais as follows: 
Anyway, we were going down the road and one guy in particular was about 30, 40 yards 
off the road and they were scattered. This was on the, they'd be on the west side of the 
road and he had some cattle down in those sand knolls and anyway they were scattered 
down through that area on the line going down along through the sage brush and the one 
guy was about 30, 40 yards off the road and Ed stopped and called him over to the truck, 
and asked him "Did you see that sign?" '"No," he said. "Didn't you see that sign?" And 
the guy said "What sign?" And I don't know if I should get into this or not but that was 
like setting off a fuse to the dynamite to Ed if you denied seeing the sign that in plain 
view, which obviously their car was parked past that sign so they drove right past it. 
Anyway, Ed, he made the guy get on the running board of the pickup and he was going to 
take him back and show him the sign and on the way back - we were going in reverse 
and anyway at that particular time, Ed called this guy everything but a white man. So the 
guy jumped off the running board and said "I don't have to take that from you." But 
anyway, Ed made all the guys get together and told them to get off the Island. (R. 1151 
at 450-51.) 
R 
Craig Bleazard. Craig Bleazard testified that on several occasions 
he witnessed John Bleazard order people to leave not only the 
private property located on the Stansbury Road, but also the 
Stansbury Road itself. (R. 1150 at 387-88.) 
The evidence of record, therefore, supports the trial court's conclusion that from 1949 to 
1993 the landowner (or their lessees) who were using the Island for winter grazing routinely 
ordered members of the public to leave the private property, including the Stansbury Road and 
Side Roads, In addition, the record evidences that Appellants, during the late 1970s and 
continuing through the 1980s, sought the help of the Tooele County Sheriffs Office to prevent 
people from trespassing on their private property, including the Side Roads. 
Contrary to the State's assertion, therefore, substantial evidence exists to support the trial 
court's findings the public's use of the Side Roads was not continuous. 
2. The Record Supports the Trial Court's Finding that the Property Along the 
Stansbury Road Including the Side Roads was Posted "No Trespassing." 
By arguing that there did not exist any "no trespassing" signs at the entrance to the Pass 
Canyon and Gated Cable Roads, the State is implicitly contesting the trial court's finding that the 
private property located to the sides of the Stansbury Road, including the Side Roads, was posted 
"no trespassing." (R. 1136, Findings of Fact ffl[52 & 57; and R 1140, Conclusions of Law 
% 17.) The State, however, has failed to marshal the evidence in support thereof and, therefore, 
this court must assume that finding to be accurate. Young v Young, 1999 UT 3, % 15, 979 P.2d 
338. 
In any event, the trial court's finding that the lands along the Stansbury Road were posted 
"no trespassing," including the Side Roads, is supported by the record. John Bleazard testified 
that for as long as he can remember the private property was posted "no trespassing" not only at 
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the point where the Stansbury Road enters onto private property, but also where the road left the 
land of one landowner and entered onto another. (R. 1150 at 293-97.) See also Appellants' 
Brief at pp. 20-21. In each such instance, John Bleazard testified the signs were located to the 
side of the road facing on-coming traffic and were intended to refer to the entirety of the private 
property, including the Stansbury Road and Side Roads. (R. 1150 at 293-97.) Consistent 
therewith, the evidence demonstrates that trespassers were routinely ordered off of the lands 
adjacent to the Stansbury Road, including the Side Roads. See Part I. A. 1 above. 
B. The Trial Court Did Not Add Dispositive Requirements to Those Set 
Forth in Section 72-5-104. 
The State's assertion that the trial court improperly added disposition requirements to 
those set forth in Section 72-5-104 is without merit. Although Appellants agree that the fact a 
public entity has not designated a road to be public or maintained it as such is not dispositive, 
there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the court treated those findings as such. 
Likewise, the trial court's finding that landowners treated the land along the Stansbury Road as 
private property, including the Side Roads, does not support the conclusion that the trial court 
treated the landowners "intent" as dispositive. Rather, this finding is merely supportive of its 
ultimate finding that the landowners "routinely" ordered people to leave their property. 
Clearly, the trial court's conclusion that the Side Roads had not been dedicated to public 
use is based on its finding that the landowners posted the property "no trespassing," sought the 
assistance of law enforcement to prevent trespass and "routinely" ordered members of the public 
to leave the private property, thereby interrupting the public's use thereof See, e.g., Draper 
City, 888 R2d at 1099-1100. 
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C. The State's Contention That Appellants Lacked the Authority to 
Order Trespassers Off the Castagno Parcels is Without Merit 
By arguing that Appellants lacked any legal right to order people to leave the Castagno 
property, the State is improperly attempting to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. This 
issue was not raised in the State's trial brief, was not addressed during opening arguments and 
was not argued by the State in its closing arguments. As a consequence, neither the Appellants 
or the trial court addressed this issue below and no findings have been entered concerning the 
factual issues raised thereby. This court, therefore, should not address this issue. State v. Lopez, 
886 P.2d 1105, 1113 (Utah 1994). 
In any event, the State's argument is without merit. First, the mere fact that Appellants 
did not own the Castagno parcels does not, by itself, support the conclusion a person lacked the 
legal authority to order trespassers to leave. Here, the record evidences that the owners of the 
Castagno and Cassity parcels are related to one another and have historically allowed their lands 
to be utilized by each other as "open range." (R. 1150 at 283-86, R. 1151 at 423-24.) Based on 
this long standing practice (R. 1151 at 423-24), the record discloses that the landowners (or their 
lessees) who wintered cattle on the Island have been throwing trespassers off each other's 
property since the 1950s. Given that the Appellant's were being allowed to run cattle on the 
Castagno parcels, absent evidence to the contrary, there is no basis to assume that Appellants 
lacked the authority to protect their interests by ordering trespassers to leave. During the trial, 
however, not a single landowner disputed Appellants' right to order trespassers to leave their 
property or repudiated their actions in doing so. 
In addition, since 1952, Ed Cassity and later Appellant's have owned various parcels of 
land over which the Stansbury Road is located, including the first two miles thereof See State's 
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Brief, Illustration One p. 8. Thus, a person using the Cable Gate Road would have had to have 
already trespassed across more than two miles of Appellants' land and would have to trespass 
back over those lands to leave the Island. Clearly, a landowner has the right to order such people 
to go south below where their lands are located. 
In conclusion, substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that trespassers were 
routinely ordered off of the lands located along the Stansbury Road, including the Side Roads. 
Contrary to the argument of the State, this evidence covers the entire time period from 
1949-1993, and not just the period after 1977. Moreover, it is also clear that Appellant's had the 
legal right to order trespassers using the Cable Gate Road to go all the way south below their 
lands. 
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court's finding that the public did not continuously 
use must be affirmed.4 
n. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
STANSBURY ROAD HAD BEEN DEDICATED TO THE PUBLIC. 
The trial court erred in concluding that the Stansbury Road had been dedicaled to public 
use. First, given the trial court's finding that trespassers were "routinely" ordered to leave the 
private property located along the Stansbury Road (Addendum A, pp. 12-16, ffl[ 53, 59, 64 & 17) 
and "occasionally" ordered to leave the Stansbuiy Road itself (Addendum A, pp. 7-8, 1flJ27 & 
31), the trial court erred in concluding that the public's use of the road was "continuous." 
Second, given the uncontraverted evidence of the State's own witnesses that the owners of the 
Castagno parcels knowingly and willfully permitted the public to recreate on their private 
4
 For reasons set forth in Appellants' Brief at pp. 24-35 and Part n.B of this brief, it is also 
Appellants' contention that the use of the Cable Gate Road was "permissive." 
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property, the trial court erred in concluding that the recreational use of the Stansbury Road was 
as a "public thoroughfare." 
A. As A Matter Of Law, The Trial Court Erred In Concluding That The 
Use Of The Stansbury Road Was Continuous. 
In response to Appellant's brief, the State does not dispute the trial court found members 
of the public were "routinely" ordered to leave the Side Roads and "occasionally" ordered to 
leave the Stansbury Road. Further, the State dies not dispute that the testimony on which these 
findings are necessarily based evidences that in these instances the trespassers were ordered to go 
all the way off the private property to the south end of the Island. Rather, the State argues that: 
(1) These actions constitute "insignificant intermissions," rather than an interruption 
in the public's continuous use of the road; 
(2) These actions only involved people who were bothering cattle, shooting guns or 
littering; and 
(3) In any event, the trial court's other unchallenged findings of fact compel this court 
to affirm the trial court's conclusion the road was continuously used by the public. 
The State's arguments miss the point and otherwise lack merit. 
1. The Trial Court's Express Findings of Fact are Inconsistent with its 
Conclusion the Stansbury Road was Continuously Used by the Public. 
As discussed in Part I above, in order for a public dedication to occur the public must 
have been able to use the road "as often as the claimant had occasion or chose to pass." See, e.g., 
Campbell, 962 P.2d at 809, quoting Richards v. Pines Ranch, Inc. 599 P.2d 948, 949 (Utah 
1977). In the present instance, however, the trial court found that the public was not able to use 
the Stansbury Road wherever they choose. Specifically, the trial court expressly found that 
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members of the public were on "occasion" ordered to leave the Stansbury Road and to go south 
off the private property (Addendum A at pp 7-8, ff 27 & 31) It follows therefrom that the 
public was not able to use the Stansbury Road on every occasion it chose to pass and, therefore, 
as a matter of law the public's use of the road was not continuous 
In addition, the trial court also found the members of the public were "routinely" ordered 
to leave the private property along the Stansbury Road (R 1136-1140 f 53, 59, 64 & 17) 
Although these findings do not specify where the people were ordered to go,5 the findings are 
necessarily based on of the witnesses who testified in this regard - Dale Castagno, John 
Bleazard, Mark Bleazard, Craig Smith, Keith E Wanlass and Charles Durfee As set forth in 
Part IA 1 above, in every such instance these witnesses testified either that these trespassers 
were ordered to the south end of the Island onto public lands or to leave the "private property " 
Conversely, not a single witness testified as to a single instance in which a trespasser was merely 
asked to get back onto the Stansbury Road Given that these trespassers were ordered to get all 
the way off of the private property by going to the south end of the Island, in every such 
instance, therefore, they were also denied the use of the Stansbury Road 
Despite the foregoing, the State attempts to brush aside these findings and underlying 
evidence as demonstrating nothing more than "insignificant intermissions" in the public's use of 
the road, citing the Campbell and Thurman cases The State's reliance on these decisions is 
misplaced Supportive of Appellant's position, the Campbell decision holds that "the public 
must have been able to use the road whenever they found it necessary or convenient" 962 P 2d 
5
 In Finding of Fact No 31 the court finds that on "several occasions" people were ordered to go 
south onto public lands (Appellants' Bnef Addendum at p 8 ) Given that the trial court found 
trespassers were routmely ordered to leave the pnvate lands, this finding does not answer where the 
rest were sent if not to the south end 
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at 809. Hence, because the landowners in that case occasionally blocked the road by means of a 
locked gate, this court concluded that the use of the road was not continuous. Id Similarly, in 
Thurman there was no evidence of any members of the public having ever been told to leave the 
road, the lands along the road were fenced off from the road and the sheriffs office had only 
been requested to prevent trespass on the lands adjacent to the road. Except for periodically 
blocking the road to facilitate the movement of sheep, there was no evidence whatsoever that the 
public was prevented from using the road. 626 P.2d at 449. 
2. The Trial Court Erred in Differentiating Between the General Public and 
Those People Who Were Ordered to Leave Because They Were Hunting. 
Shooting Guns, Harassing Cattle or Littering. 
In Finding of Fact No. 30, the trial court found that "Ed Cassity... as well as other 
owners and stock raisers, differentiated between the public's use of the road by the public and 
those who used guns around the cattle operations, either on the Stansbury Road or on private 
property."6 (Addendum A at p. 8.) Although the testimony was not limited to ordering people to 
leave the Stansbury Road who were shooting guns, hunting, littering, etc. (see Part LA. 1 above), 
most of the specific incidents recounted by the witnesses involved such conduct. In part, this is 
because the landowners (or their lessees) who ran cattle on the Island used it for winter range 
and, therefore, were mostly out on the Island during the winter season. (R. 1708-10, R. 426.) 
6
 During the hearing on August 5, 2004, Judge Skanchy explained his finding regarding whether 
trespassers were ordered to leave the Stansbury Road as follows: 
I think that my finding was based upon the fact that it appears to be that the evidence 
presented at trial over a historical period was that people were given unrestricted use 
of that roadway. If there was something that offended one of the owners, particularly 
hunting, either shooting off the roadway at something that could be close to cattle or 
being off the roadway itself, which seemed to be the bulk of what testimony I heard, 
that those people were given their marching orders and asked to leave the property. 
And so that's the distinction I made. (R. 355 at 12.) 
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During the winter, the primary reason people would go out on to the Island during the winter was 
to go hunting or shooting. (R. 411.) The preferred way to hunt in the winter was from the back 
of a truck while driving down the Stansbury Road. (R. 1498-1502.) 
Even assuming, however, the landowners (or their lessees) only ordered people who were 
hunting or shooting to leave the Stansbury Road, it does not follow that the public's use of the 
road was continuous. Everyone who used the Stansbury Road did, for one reason or another, to 
go camping, hiking, horseback riding, Easter egg hunting, etc. It is axiomatic that a private 
property owner has the right to chose who can or cannot enjoy the use of his or her private 
property. The fact that Ed Cassity may have only chosen to order to leave people who were 
engaged in objectionable conduct does not exclude these people from the categoiy of public 
users. Whatever may have been Ed Cassity's (or the other landowners or lessees) motivation in 
ordering such people to leave, they were nevertheless members of the public who were denied 
the use of the Stansbury Road. 
In any event, the trial court's finding that trespassers were "routinely" ordered to leave 
the lands along the Stansbury Road is not limited to such instances. As discussed above, given 
that these trespassers were ordered all of the way off the private property, each of these instances 
also denied these members of the public the use of the Stansbury Road. 
3. Given the Trial Court's Express Findings, the State's Reliance on the Trial 
Court's Other Findings of Fact is Misplaced. 
Finally, the State argues that the trial court's other unchallenged findings demonstrate 
that the Stansbury Road was continuously used by the public. Specifically, the State references 
the trial court's finding that (1) other landowners believed or treated the Stansbury Road as 
public; (2) the Stansbury Road was a class B road; (3) the public used the road for a variety of 
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recreational activities; and (4) that the vast majority of the general public did not seek permission 
to use the road nor were they asked to leave the road. 
While Appellants agree that these findings may be probative of a public dedication, these 
findings do not in and of themselves establish either that the public's use was continuous or that 
such use was as a public thoroughfare. In this instance, the trial court expressly found that the 
public was routinely ordered to leave the lands along the road and occasionally ordered to leave 
the road itself. In light of these express findings, the State's reliance on these other findings is 
misplaced. 
B. The Public's Use of the Stansbury Road Was Permissive. 
On appeal, the State does not dispute that the trial court erred in relying on the use of the 
Stansbury Road by the various commercial enterprises and their invitees, and the State, BLM and 
county employees in finding that the Stansbury Road was used continuously as a public 
thoroughfare. Nevertheless, the State contends that this is "immaterial since most of the use of 
the Stansbury Road was by members of the public that do not fall within the category of 
permissive users." Brief of Appellee at p. 26. 
As set forth in Appellant's Brief, the uncontraverted testimony of the State's own 
witnesses establishes that private landowners on the Island knowingly and willfully allowed the 
public to recreate on their private lands. Appellants' Brief at pp. 30-32. Accordingly, it was 
Appellant's contention below that since the use of the private property was permissive, the use of 
the Stansbury Road to access that property must also have been permissive. 
In rejecting this argument the trial court concluded: 
One cannot rationally, or successfully argue that permitting anyone 
and everyone to use the Stansbury Road "as long as they behaved 
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themselves," made the public permissive users. Rather, such usage 
is the grist upon which public dedication is ground . . . . An overt 
act is required by the owner to distinguish the general public from 
a permissive user. An overt act may be to unlock a gate for a 
limited time period, or give a pass to certain individuals, or to 
openly declare that a particular person, or class of persons, are 
permitted to use the property, while others are not. No such 
distinctions were made here, as the public was able to use the 
Stansbury Road as it found it necessary and convenient. 
R. 1030-31 (emphasis added). 
In other words, the trial court concluded that a private landowner cannot permit the 
general public as a whole to recreate on his or her own land or, at least, if a landowner does so, 
the public's use is not "permissive." This conclusion of the trial court is erroneous. 
In Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d at 806, the landowner opened a gate so the 
general public could use the road during the deer season. Based thereon, this court affirmed the 
trial court's conclusion that the public's use of the road was permissive: 
In this case, the trail court concluded that the deer hunters used 
Ridge Road with the Campbell's permission. The trial court based 
this conclusion on testimony at the hearing that the Campbells had 
unlocked the gate every year except 1994 for deer hunting season 
and had relocked it at the end of each hunting reason. The trial 
court correctly concluded that permissive use of Ridge Road could 
not result in dedication as a public thoroughfare. 
Id Likewise, in Heber City, the general public was allowed to use the road to access a municipal 
airport. In concluding that use of the road by the general public was permissive, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that: ". . . the public's use of the Airport Road simply to go to and from 
the airport is of the permissive nature that will not lead to a dedication and abandonment to the 
public, as this is precisely how Heber City wanted the road used." 942 P.2d at 312, fh. 10. 
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The trial court's conclusion is also inconsistent with the express public policy of State of 
Utah. As set forth in the Recreational User's Act, Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1 (2004), it is the 
purpose of that act "to encourage public and private owners of land to make land and water areas 
available to the public for recreational purposes...." Utah Code Ann. § 57-14-1. It is 
incongruous for the State on one hand to encourage private landowners to allow the public to 
recreate on their private land and, on the other hand, for the trial court to conclude that the 
public's use thereof is not permissive. 
HI. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PUBLIC'S INTEREST IN THE STANSBURY ROAD EXTENDS 
ACROSS THE MAGCORP PARCEL TO THE GATE ON THE 
NORTH DIKE. 
The State makes three arguments in support of the trial court's finding that the public's 
interest in the road extends all the way to the gate on the MagCorp Dike. First, the State argues 
that Appellants' are improperly attempting to raise this issue for the first time on appeal. 
Second, the State argues Appellants* failed to marshal the evidence. Finally, the State argues the 
evidence supports the trial court's findings. 
A. The Appellants9 Raised the Issue Concerning the State's Ownership 
of the MagCorp Parcel Below. 
During the trial, Appellants established that the MagCorp Parcel was purchased from the 
State of Utah in the mid to late 1960s on a twenty year installment contract and, therefore, 
MagCorp did not receive legal title thereto until the mid to late 1980s. (R. 1149 at 151.) Based 
thereon, during closing arguments Appellant asserted that the road across the MagCorp Parcel 
could not be a public road as a matter of law. (R. 1151 at 485-87.) Thus, the State's contention 
that Appellants failed to raise this issue below is false. 
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B+ Appellants Did Not Fail to Marshall the Evidence. 
In support of Appellant's contention that the State failed to establish a public dedication 
all the way to the meander line of the Great Salt Lake, Appellants referred this court to every 
scrap of evidence of public use across the MagCorp parcel. Contrary to the Stated; belief, the 
additional evidence set forth in its brief is not probative of any additional public use. 
Specifically, the boilerplate statements in the affidavits attesting to the affiants having used the 
road "all the way to the northern tip of the West Stansbury Island . . ." does not evidence public 
use across the MagCorp parcel. This is because the Cable Gate Road is the only road that 
accesses the northern tip of the Island and it is undisputed that the turnofffor that road is prior to 
the MagCorp parcel. See Appellee's Brief at p. 8., Illustration One. Moreover, the statements of 
the affiants that they "also witnessed other members of the public who would drive to the end of 
the road. . ." lacks specificity and is inconsistent with the maps attached by the affiants 
specifying the portions of the roads they actually used. 
Appellants, therefore, properly marshaled every scrap of evidence pertaining to the 
public's use of this portion of the road. 
C. The Evidence Does Not Support the Trial Court's Finding. 
As set forth in Appellants' Brief, Part II. A, for the entire time period from 1949-1993, the 
only members of the general public the State established used the Stansbury Road across the 
MagCorp parcel to the meander line of the Great Salt Lake were Neldo Lemmon, Sam 
Wingfield, Jr. and Howard Murray, 
Paragraph 4 of Mr. Lemmon's affidavit only evidences he and his family driving out onto 
the Dike on one occasion. (R. 1402-05.) Whether or not he did that on more than on occasion is 
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unknown, but given his affidavit states that he helped livestock operators out on the Island during 
the 1960s and 1970s, any such use may well have been permissive. Likewise, although the 
affidavit of Sam Wingfield evidences that he also used the road all the way to the Dike (R. 1519-
25), it is uncontraverted that he also went out on the Island with John Bleazard to hunt. Thus, we 
also do not know whether his use of the road across the MagCorp parcel was permissive or not. 
Finally, the map attached to Howard Murray's indicates that he used to road all the way to the 
meander line but is silent as to how often this occurred. 
Clearly, affidavits evidencing the use of a road by three people that are silent as to when 
and how often this use occurred is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a public dedication. 
Further, this portion of the Stansbury Road did not even exist until 1965 and has been posted "no 
trespassing" since that time. The uncontraverted evidence of record establishes that the vast 
majority of people using the Stansbury Road would stop and turn around when they came into 
sight of the "no trespassing" sign. This action, therefore, demonstrates the public did not feel 
free to use that portion of the road whenever they wanted and, therefore, no public dedication 
occurred. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING ORDINANCE 93-9 
INVALID. 
As discussed in Appellants' Brief, the only issues before the Utah Supreme Court in State 
v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, 44 P.3d 680 were (1) whether Section 27-12-102.4 required mail 
notice in addition to notice by publication and (2) whether the State was an abutting landowner 
of record without the meaning of that statute. Thus, the issue as to whether the State was entitled 
to mail notice regardless as to whether the portion of the Stansbury Road that abuts sovereign 
land was a "public" road was not before the Supreme Court in Tooele County, had not been 
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addressed by the trial court, and had not been briefed by the parties. The Utah Supreme Court's 
holding in Tooele County that if the State's property located below the meander line of the Great 
Salt Lake abuts the Stansbury Road uas described in the County's proposed vacation notice," 
then the ordinance is null and void, therefore, is dicta that should not have been followed by the 
trial court for several reasons. 
A. The Dicta in Tooele County is Inconsistent with the Plain Language of 
Section 27-12-102.4. 
In pertinent part, Section 27-12-102.4 requires mail notice to be provided "to all owners 
of record of land abutting the county road proposed to be vacated" (emphasis added). Based 
upon its express language, therefore, Section 27-12-104.4 only requires mail notice to 
landowners who abut a county road. 
B. The Dicta in Tooele County Is Not Necessary to Effectuate the 
Statutory Purpose for Requiring Written Notice. 
It is well settled that an abutting landowner to a public road has a right of reasonable 
access to his or her property. See e.g., Memmott v. Anderson, 642 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); 
Mason v. State, 656 P.2d 465, 469 (Utah 1982); and Bailey Services & Supply Corp., 533 P.2d 
882, 883-84 (Utah 1975). Thus, an abutting landowner to a public road has a separate and 
distinct interest from that of the general public. It is undoubtedly for this reason that Section 
27-12-102.4 required actual notice by mail to such abutting landowners. 
Assuming the public portion, if any, of the Stansbury Road does not extend to sovereign 
lands, the State would not have an interest in the road separate and distinct from the general 
public. It follows therefrom that the statutory purpose would not be undermined by allowing 
Appellants in this case to assert the State was not entitled to written notice in the first place. 
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C The Dicta in Tooele Count Unnecessarily Undermines the Decisions of 
Duly Elected Legislative Bodies. 
In instances such as the present, where the scope and extent of the public's interest in a 
road is unknown, common sense dictates that a county should do exactly as Tooele County did -
include in the legal description of the road proposed to be vacated the entire road in question and 
provide mail notice to all the abutting landowners thereof. 
In circumstances where an abutting landowner did not receive mail notice and initiates a 
lawsuit seeking to set aside the ordinance, however, public policy favors allowing a party to 
assert that the landowner was not entitled to written notice in the first place. Specifically, a 
court's would not thereby unnecessarily be setting aside decisions of a duly elected legislative 
body and be furthering the public interest in citizens being able to rely on the decisions of such 
duly elected legislative bodies. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this court should declare Ordinance 93-9 valid. In the 
alternative, this court should reverse the trial court's judgment that the Stansbury Road was 
dedicated to the public and affirm the trial court's judgment that the Side Roads had not been so 
dedicated. 
DATED this J9 day of September 2005. 
Brent A. Bohman 
Attorney for Six Mile Ranch Company, 
Craig Bleazard, Mark C. Bleazard and John 
C. Bleazard 
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I hereby certify that on the j°t day of September, 2005, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing — was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Douglas Ahlstrom 
Tooele County Attorney 
47 South Main 
Tooele, UT 84074 
Stephen Schwendiman 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
160 East 300 South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140815 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0815 
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